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An ex-ante analysis of distributional effects of the CAP on 
western German farm incomes  
Andre Deppermann, Harald Grethe and Frank Offermann 
 
Abstract 
This study is concerned with measuring impacts of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on 
farm income distribution of western Germany. Not only the sheer contribution of market price 
support and direct payments as a proportion of income is taken into account, but also the im-
pact of support on production incentives. For this purpose, we apply a modelling system con-
sisting of a partial equilibrium model and a programming model. Based on a comparison of 
Gini coefficients and a decomposition of overall inequality effects we conclude that liberaliza-
tion of the agricultural sector leads to a more unequal distribution of family farm income in 
relative terms, whereas a liberalized market provides a more equal situation in absolute terms. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
Among other motives, agricultural policy is often justified as income support to farm 
households for equity matters. This is especially true for first pillar measures of the CAP. It is 
well known that this policy is not free from major imperfections, such as low transfer efficiency 
and high transaction costs. But does the CAP reduce income gaps in the agricultural sector at 
all? What kind of distributional effects would a further liberalization of the European agricul-
tural sector entail? This paper aims at contributing to ongoing research trying to answer these 
questions. In recent years, several studies concerned with redistributive effects of agricultural 
policy have been carried out via the application of different methods. 
OECD (2003) measures the degree of concentration of gross farm receipts, agricultural 
support and net operating income per farm by estimating relative Gini coefficients and Lorenz 
curves. Based on a comparison of these measures, the authors conclude that for most OECD 
countries under consideration, agricultural support has relatively small effects on distribution by 
farm size because the distribution of agricultural support is only marginally less unequal than 
the distribution of gross receipts. 
Schmid et al. (2006) compare relative Gini coefficients of direct payments per farm hold-
ing for single EU-15 member states. They show that the degree of distribution of direct pay-
ments is fundamentally different yet is closely related to the concentration of land inside the re-
spective member states. In a more detailed analysis for Austria, they find that larger holdings 
get the bulk of direct payments and that less favored area payments only have little equalizing 
effects. 
A prominent method to detect income distribution effects of agricultural policy is based 
on a decomposition of the Gini coefficient of income inequality by single income sources. Von Ancona - 122
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Witzke and Noleppa (2007) decompose a relative Gini coefficient as well as a related measure 
of absolute inequality of total farm profit into components for direct payments and market prof-
it. The authors conclude that direct payments account for about one-third of overall inequality 
for family farms and for two-thirds of overall inequality for incorporated farms. 
Keeney (2000) goes one step further: based on a decomposition of a relative Gini coeffi-
cient for family farm income, the impact of marginal changes in direct payments and market in-
come on total inequality is reported. According to this study, direct payments reduced relative 
income inequality in Ireland between 1992 and 1996. 
Several similar studies have been carried out for U.S farm households. For example, 
Ahearn et al. (1985) analyze the effects of direct government payments on income of farm op-
erator households in 1984. They find little equalizing effects of direct government payments at 
the margin in relative terms, arguing that this finding might hold in the short run only as their 
data set included a high proportion of large farms with negative incomes. They conclude that 
off-farm employment opportunities have a higher potential to equalize household incomes than 
government payments. Mishra et al. (2009) investigate relative inequality effects of government 
payments on farm household incomes, differentiated for nine farming regions in the U.S. They 
find that income from government programs decrease total income inequality, though regionally 
differing in extent. Furthermore, they highlight the important role of off-farm income for the re-
duction in inequality. 
The method of decomposing the Gini coefficient into its single income sources used by 
the studies cited above serves well as a measure of the marginal impact of each income source 
to overall inequality. Nevertheless, this method cannot be used to detect different characteristics 
of inequality, such as the distinction between vertical and horizontal effects of redistribution. 
To account for the different dimensions of impacts from inequality, Allanson, through a 
series of papers, uses another approach which is based on a comparison of Gini indices of pre- 
and post-support income distribution. Allanson (2006) estimates changes of relative Gini coeffi-
cients for Scottish farm households. In this paper, the overall redistribution effect of agricultural 
policy support is split up into a vertical dimension of inequality and a re-ranking effect. An un-
equalizing overall effect of agricultural policy is found which is caused by re-ranking effects 
overtaking the equalizing vertical effects. The method is extended in Allanson (2008) by addi-
tionally  accounting  for  classical  horizontal  inequity.  The  unequal  treatment  of  pre-transfer 
equals is found to be the main reason for the increase in overall inequality. Allanson (2007) uses 
this method with relative and absolute measures of inequality. Allanson and Rocchi (2008) find 
similar results through a comparative analysis for Tuscany and Scotland. 
In a completely different approach, Rocchi (2009) uses a SAM-based model to analyze 
income distribution changes from the single payment scheme of the CAP for Italy. This ap-
proach is able to distinguish between direct and indirect impacts of agricultural policy on in-
come  distribution  among  agricultural  as  well  as  non-agricultural  households.  However,  the 
analysis is carried out at a highly aggregated level and does not take price effects into account. Ancona - 122
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Similar to Allanson (2006), our paper uses the Gini comparison method to account for 
different dimensions of distributional effects of agricultural policy on farm income in western 
Germany. Previous research is extended by executing an ex-ante analysis of income effects of 
changes in agricultural policy for 2015 based on an equilibrium model. Thereby, incentive ef-
fects are fully taken into account for the first time. Major drawbacks of the analysis framework 
include unconsidered effects of structural changes not depicted in the modelling system and the 
need for grouping micro data, though we undertake this at a relatively low aggregation level. 
Specifically, we identify impacts of liberalizing the European agricultural sector on farm in-
come distribution for two different scenarios in relative and absolute inequality terms. Further-
more, we analyze the relevance of nonfarm income for effects on inequality in the case of liber-
alization. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we first present the underlying mod-
elling system before describing our method of measuring distributional effects, the data and sce-
nario assumptions; in Section 3 we present the results, beginning with sectoral results before re-
distributive  effects  of  the  CAP  and  nonfarm  incomes  are  introduced;  and  in  Section  4  we 
provide a summary and conclusions. 
2.  METHODS AND DATA 
2.1.  Modelling Approach 
In our analysis of distributional effects of agricultural policy, we account not only for the 
sheer contribution of market price support and direct payments as a proportion of income, but 
also for the impact of support on production incentives. For this purpose, we apply a modelling 
system consisting of a partial equilibrium model and a programming model (for a detailed de-
scription, see Deppermann et al., 2010). The partial equilibrium model is the European Simula-
tion Model (ESIM) which quantifies effects of agricultural policies at the European and German 
level, while the programming model is the Farm Modelling Information System (FARMIS) 
which measures impacts on intra-sectoral income distribution among farm groups in Germany.  
ESIM (Banse et al., 2010) is a comparative-static, net-trade, partial equilibrium model of 
the European agricultural sector. It depicts the EU-27 at the member state level with a strong fo-
cus on EU common agricultural policies. Altogether ESIM contains 31 regions and 47 products 
and a high degree of EU policy detail including specific and ad valorem tariffs, tariff rate quo-
tas, intervention and threshold prices, export subsidies, coupled and decoupled direct payments, 
production quotas and set-aside regulations. 
FARMIS is a comparative-static process-analytical programming model for farm groups 
(Osterburg et al., 2001; Bertelsmeier, 2005; Offermann et al., 2005). Production is differentiated 
for 27 crop and 15 livestock activities. The matrix restrictions cover the areas of feeding (energy 
and nutrient requirements, calibrated feed rations), intermediate use of young livestock, fertil-
izer use (organic and mineral), labor (seasonally differentiated), crop rotations and political in-
struments (e.g., set-aside and quotas). The model specification is based on information from the Ancona - 122
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German farm accountancy data network covering about 11,000 farms, supplemented by data 
from farm management manuals. Key characteristics of FARMIS are: 1) the use of aggregation 
factors that allow for a representation of the sectors’ production and income indicators; 2) input-
output coefficients which are consistent with information from farm accounts; and 3) the use of 
a positive mathematical programming procedure to calibrate the model to the observed base 
year levels. FARMIS uses farm groups rather than single farms not only to ensure the confiden-
tiality of individual farm data, but also to increase manageability and the robustness of the 
model system when dealing with data errors that may exist in individual cases. Homogenous 
farm groups are generated by the aggregation of single farm data. For this study farms were 
stratified by region, type and size, resulting in 597 farm groups. 
The two single models are fully integrated via iteratively exchanging vectors of solution 
variables until both models converge on these variables in the analysis of joint scenarios. 
2.2.  Measurement of Distributional Effects 
In this article we analyze redistributive effects of agricultural policy by comparing differ-
ent scenarios calculated with the described modelling system. One scenario assumes the status 
quo of agricultural policy until 2015 and two scenarios assume different states of liberalization. 
The question we pose is whether agricultural policy makes income among western German 
farms more equally distributed.  
At least in the short run (because we cannot account for structural changes triggered by 
liberalization), liberalization has clear negative impacts on farm income on average (Depper-
mann et al., 2010). Yet how can we talk about equalizing effects in a case where mean income 
is not comparable? As Lambert (2001) points out, this is possible because we implicitly com-
pare the new situation with another one in which income would have been reduced in a distribu-
tion neutral way. The latter is used as a natural benchmark to evaluate distributional effects. 
Based on Musgrave and Thin (1948), Kakwani (1986) develops a measure of redistribu-
tion that is based on a comparison of relative Gini coefficients and decomposes the total effect 
into a vertical and a re-ranking component, which Allanson (2006) applies to agricultural pol-
icy:  
 
  x y x y y y R G G (G C ) (C G ) V H = - = - + - = +   (1) 
 
where R represents the overall effect of redistribution as the difference of the Gini index in the 
base situation (Gx) and the Gini index in the new situation (Gy), Cy is the concentration index
1 of 
income in the new situation, and V and H are indices of vertical redistribution and re-ranking, 
                                                       
 
 
1 The concept of concentration indices is closely related to the concept of the Gini index; however, instead of ranking 
income in ascending order, income units are kept in the position of another distribution. The new income situation is 
combined with the old ranking. The Gini index of the new situation equals the Concentration index in the case where 
no reranking occurs. Ancona - 122
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respectively. Generally, the concept of vertical equity represents the idea that a monetary burden 
on individuals should increase with their capacity to bear that burden. A positive (negative) sign 
for V indicates that in case of income losses, in our case due to a reduction of government sup-
port, the burden is progressively (regressively) allocated among the total farm population. Nev-
ertheless, V does not measure the “pure” degree of deviation from a proportional burden share 
because it also depends on the average rate of burden. This becomes obvious with a further de-
composition of V: 







  (2) 
 
where s represents the rate of average burden of the whole farm population and P represents the 
Kakwani (1977) measure of progressivity which equals CB - Gx, with CB being the concentration 
index of burden.
2 P measures the extent to which burden payments are distributed more un-
equally or equally than income in the base situation (Aronson et al., 1994). But the degree of 
deviation from a proportional share of burden does not entirely explain the new state of distribu-
tion (Atkinson, 1980; Plotnick, 1981). The index of vertical redistribution equals the overall ef-
fect of redistribution only in case where no re-ranking of farms occurs. In our analysis this 
would be if farms were arranged in ascending order of their income in the baseline situation and 
still hold the same rank after liberalizing the agricultural sector. Otherwise the index of vertical 
equity overestimates the redistribution effect by also including rank reversal effects. To illus-
trate the impacts of re-ranking on inequality, let us assume an extreme case in which, due to an 
imaginary policy, all individuals of a population have to switch their income: the highest in-
come is replaced with the lowest, the second highest income with the second lowest and so on. 
This policy would be highly progressive (as the highest incomes have to bear the highest burden 
and the lowest incomes get the most), but there would be no change in the overall distribution. 
To account for re-ranking, the index H (which is also known as the Atkinson-Plotnik-index of 
re-ranking) is applied in equation (1). It can be interpreted as an indicator of arbitrariness or dis-
crimination of the examined income redistribution system. Atkinson (1980) refers to the effect 
as “mobility” induced by an income policy, which might be of interest in its own right. If re-
ranking occurs, it always has a negative impact on the overall redistribution index (Lambert, 
2001). 
Aronson and Lambert (1994) point out that several scholars equated the re-ranking effect 
with the concept of horizontal equity. These scholars argue that horizontal equity, classically de-
fined as the equal treatment of equals, must be violated if re-ranking occurs. In another ap-
proach Aronson and Lambert (1994) identify re-ranking as a component separate from classical 
                                                       
 
 
2 In our paper we treat the reduction of income caused by liberalization like a tax. In case one wants to measure the 
effects of cash benefits, the formula should be V=(Gx-CB)(s/1+s). Ancona - 122
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horizontal equity and decompose the overall effect of redistribution into a vertical (VE), a re-
ranking (RR) and a classical horizontal component (CH): 
 
  R VE CH RR = - -   (3) 
 
To identify classical horizontal inequity, they build groups of equal income individuals and 
measure inside-group inequality. We do not use this approach because our calculation is based 
on average income of homogenous farm groups and therefore we could not detect any inside-
group inequality. 
The described approach was so far based on the relative Gini coefficient. One property of 
relative measures of inequality is that proportional changes in all incomes do not change ine-
quality (they are scale invariant). Instead, it depends on the subjective evaluation of how ine-
quality is affected by particular types of income changes (Chakravarty, 1990). Thus, in our 
analysis we apply as a second measure the absolute Gini index. The two concepts are closely 
related – the absolute Gini is obtained by multiplying the relative one with the mean income of 
the sample – but they react differently on income changes. Absolute measures of inequality are 
invariant to equal absolute changes in all incomes, i.e. inequality is unaffected in case an equal 
amount is added to all incomes (Kolm, 1976). Generally, the described method of decomposing 
the overall redistribution effect can similarly be applied to the absolute Gini, as well (Allanson, 
2008).  
2.3.  Data 
With the above described modelling system (see Section 2.1) different scenarios were 
conducted for the year 2015 with the model base period in 2004/2005 (see Deppermann et al., 
2010). To measure income inequality among farms in the western German agricultural sector, 
our indicator is family farm income (FFI). FFI provides information on the return to land, labor 
and capital resources owned by the farm family, as well as information on entrepreneurial risk. 
Due to the dominance of corporate farms in eastern Germany, we concentrate on western Ger-
many because no comparability between different farm structures could be ensured when using 
family farm income as an indicator. 
In the base period, income data for 357 homogenous farm groups (for western Germany) 
are generated based on information from the German farm accountancy data network covering 
about 11,000 farms, supplemented by data from farm management manuals. Farms are grouped 
by region, type and size. Average values of farm attributes are used in the modelling analysis. 
Each group is weighted with an aggregation factor to represent its correct proportion of the ba-
sic population. Income indicators are not explicitly considered when grouping the data which 
complicates the analysis of income distribution effects. Due to grouping the data and working 
with average values instead of micro data, some information on inequality is lost. For the base 
period we can observe both individual and grouped data. A comparison of the relative Gini co-Ancona - 122
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efficient reveals some differences in inequality for the base period (the Gini coefficient of single 
farm income data = 0.625 and the Gini coefficient of farm group income data = 0.36).  
For our projection year 2015, we have grouped data only. A proposed solution to deal 
with the problem of grouped data is to calculate a minimum and a maximum level of inequality 
for the distribution (e.g. Cowell, 2009); however, in our case this approach is not appropriate. 
As the upper and lower income bounds of the single groups are unknown in 2015 (theoretically 
a single farm inside a group can make infinite gains or losses which we cannot observe), it 
would be meaningless to calculate a maximum level of inequality. The inequality level we 
measure among farm groups in 2015 is the minimum level of total income inequality. Because 
of dealing with average values for farm groups, distribution among single farms cannot be more 
equal even if inside-group inequality is not observed. Yet, referring to a change in the Gini coef-
ficient of inequality among farm groups, we cannot conclude that it is the minimum change in 
the Gini coefficient of inequality among single farms (which we cannot observe). In the base 
year we assume total equality inside the groups. Thus, in the model framework inside-group dis-
tribution cannot become more equal in 2015 compared to the base year, but in reality it defi-
nitely could. Hence, we analyze changes in distribution among farm groups only.  
To draw conclusions for the total farm population (including inside-group inequalities), 
we would have to rely on assumptions such as the assumption that inside-group inequality is 
constant over time. This assumption may be valid as farms are quite homogenous in factor en-
dowment and production structure inside the groups. Thus, within-group differences of incomes 
mainly occur due to different management abilities of the farm operator or other unobserved ef-
fects. As first pillar CAP support generally is linked to output or factor endowment, its effect on 
within-group  income  differences  should  be  small. Therefore  we  would  assume  that  within-
group distribution in different scenarios is similar to the observed distribution in the base period. 
2.4.  Scenarios 
Three different scenarios are compared regarding their income distribution: a reference 
scenario (baseline) and two different liberalization scenarios. In the baseline, the 2003 Reform 
and the Health Check of the CAP are fully implemented except for the abolishment of milk quo-
tas. Milk quotas are assumed to increase until 2015 according to the Agenda 2000 decision, in-
cluding the additional 2% quota increase in 2008 and the fat adjustment in 2009/10. It is as-
sumed that a biofuel share of almost 6% in total EU transport fuel consumption will be reached 
by 2015. Furthermore, the sugar market reform is implemented and set-aside obligations are 
removed in 2008. The baseline adopts constant levels of tariffs, export subsidies, tariff rate quo-
tas (except for sugar) compared to the base situation and the current system of intervention 
prices. For the international environment, ESIM is calibrated to FAPRI world market price pro-
jections (FAPRI, 2009) and no changes in external trade policies of the EU are assumed until 
2015. 
To account for the effects of agricultural policy on income in the agricultural sector, the 
baseline results in 2015 are compared to results of a second scenario in 2015 (henceforth, liber-Ancona - 122
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alization scenario). The latter assumes a full market liberalization of EU agricultural policies 
(i.e., the abolishment of all intervention prices, tariffs, quotas and subsidies) and a cut in direct 
payments by 50%. That means that in 2015, the EU price level equals the world market price for 
tradable products. A total abolishment of direct payments would lead to strong supply changes 
in FARMIS, which are likely to be dampened in reality by structural changes within the farming 
sector as well as other components of the value chain such as the input industry. These changes, 
however, are not depicted in the current model versions. In a third scenario (henceforth, 50% 
DP cut scenario) isolated effects of a separate 50% reduction of direct payments are analyzed. 
In the second part of our analysis we consider the impact of liberalizing the agricultural 
market on income distribution under the additional consideration of nonfarm income. For meas-
uring the impact of nonfarm income, we compare the effects of liberalization on the distribution 
of FFI both including and excluding nonfarm income of the farm operator and his or her spouse. 
Data on nonfarm income are not included in the modelling system. Consequently, they are 
available for the base period of the scenarios only. We assume that the real absolute value of 
nonfarm income does not change over time
3.  
3.  RESULTS  
3.1. Sector results 
According to the model results, a 50% cut in direct payments has almost no impact on ag-
ricultural prices and production. In contrast, the liberalization scenario leads to a significant re-
duction of the prices of crop products (- 22% on average), pork (-16%), beef (-55%) and milk (  
-27%). In Germany, cereal and, in particular, arable fodder production are reduced and a signifi-
cant increase in unused (set-aside / mulching) areas is observed. Beef and pork production de-
crease by 27% and 7 %, respectively. Compared to the baseline scenario, farm net value added 
per agricultural work unit is reduced by 14% in the scenario with a 50% cut in direct payments 
and is reduced by 55% in the liberalization scenario. The decrease of FFI is partly cushioned by 
lower land rental prices, especially in farms with a high share of rented land. Moreover, on av-
erage the sum of FFI and wages per agricultural work unit
4 is cut by 7% and 50%, respectively, 
in these two scenarios. 
3.2. Redistributive Effects of the CAP 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the distribution of FFI in western Germany for all three 
scenarios. Henceforth, we will refer to FFI simply as income for matter of convenience. The 
                                                       
 
 
3 Actually, it is likely that nonfarm income and government support are negatively correlated (e.g. Vergara et al., 
2004; Kwon et al., 2006). 
4 This income indicator is often used in Germany to ensure comparability between different farm structures in light of 
the present dual structure of family and corporate farms. Ancona - 122
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curves in the graph represent percentile values.
5 The light blue line on the top depicts the in-
come distribution in the year 2015 which is our baseline scenario. Percentile values increase 
quite constantly until the 85
th percentile is reached and then increase more steeply with higher 
percentiles, hinting at high income concentration in the upper part. The next two lower lines 
represent income percentiles of the scenario with a 50% cut in direct payments (50% DP cut) 
and the scenario with an additional abolishment of all price policies (liberalization). According 
to the model results, liberalizing the agricultural sector has clear negative impacts on farm in-
come. In the liberalization scenario 26% of farms have negative incomes, whereas in the base-
line there were only very few farms with negatives incomes. However, these projections should 
be interpreted against the background that with this low-level income, significant structural 
change can be expected which is not depicted in current model specifications. The distance be-
tween the different lines can be interpreted as the value of income generated by agricultural pol-
icy. At first glance, it seems that agricultural support is more or less equally distributed in abso-
lute terms even though the distance increases some from the median on. Such a lump-sum-
transfer-like reduction of income would result in a more unequal relative income distribution. 
Yet, based on Figure 1, one can say nothing about re-ranking effects because for each scenario 
income percentiles are ranked again in ascending order. 
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5 This goes back to Jan Pen’s (1971) idea of visualizing distributions by charting their quantile functions. Ancona - 122
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Table 1: Decile groups, based on FFI for western Germany 
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1  2,468  1  -3,744  -5  3  2.52  536  0  7  0.78 
2  8,180  3  1,970  3  3  0.76  6,781  3  5  0.17 
3  12,497  5  -1,373  -2  8  1.11  10,046  4  9  0.20 
4  17,134  7  4,813  6  7  0.72  14,956  7  8  0.13 
5  20,368  8  8,396  11  7  0.59  18,584  8  7  0.09 
6  24,665  10  8,123  11  9  0.67  22,390  10  9  0.09 
7  28,394  11  4,718  06  13  0.83  25,598  11  11  0.10 
8  33,222  13  8,063  11  14  0.76  30,191  13  12  0.09 
9  41,119  16  8,948  12  18  0.78  37,414  16  14  0.09 
10  65,560  26  35,265  47  17  0.46  60,809  27  18  0.07 
All  25,361  100  7,518  100  100  0.70  22,730  100  100  0.10 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
In Table 1 total farm population is segmented into decile groups: ten groups of equal size 
with the bottom group containing 10% of farms with the lowest incomes and the top group cov-
ering the highest incomes. In the column on the left (I), the baseline income of each decile 
group is reported. The next three columns (II – IV) refer to the liberalization scenario in case 
that composition of decile groups does not change. Farms that had the lowest income under the 
baseline scenario are still located in the bottom decile. It is noticeable that higher decile groups 
after liberalization do not necessarily have a higher share of income anymore. This is a first hint 
that significant re-ranking effects might occur. For example, the third decile group has a nega-
tive income, while the second has a positive income under the liberalization scenario. One can 
interpret the difference in income between the baseline and the (two) scenario(s) as the effect of 
agricultural policy support (which, in fact, is a loss in our case as policy support is reduced). 
Column III presents for each decile group its share in total support. On the one hand, it shows 
that support is not equally shared among the groups: with liberalization high income farms take 
a higher burden than low income farms in absolute terms. On the other hand, it also shows that 
support is more equally distributed than income. The bottom decile group gets (or with liberali-
zation, loses) only 3% of total support and the top decile 17%; however, for the bottom decile 
support is equal to 252% of baseline income, while for the top decile it is only 46%. The effects 
of a sole reduction of direct payments by 50% are comparatively moderate. This is partly due to 
the high rate of capitalization of direct payments in land prices which is assumed in FARMIS. Ancona - 122
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As a consequence, land rental prices decrease significantly with a reduction of direct payments, 
which cushions negative income effects especially for farms with a high share of rented land. 
 
Table 2: Decomposition of changes in relative income inequality 
Relative inequality (scale invariant)    Liberalization Scenario  50% DP Cut Scenario 
Gini coefficient of baseline income  Gx  0.377  0.377 
Gini coefficient of scenario (after policy change)  Gy  0.966  0.402 
Concentration coefficient of scenario  Cy  0.611  0.399 
Concentration coefficient of support (base 
income – scenario income)  CB  0.278  0.182 
Average rate of support (support/base income)  s  0.70  0.10 
Total redistributive effect  R  -0.589  -0.025 
Index of re-ranking  H  -0.356  -0.002 
Index of vertical equity  V  -0.231  -0.024 
Index of progressivity of support  P  -0.099  -0.195 
Note: Gini and concentration coefficients are estimated using the sgini Stata command developed by Van Kerm 
(2009). 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
After considering shares in absolute income and support in Table 1, we now refer to the 
concept of relative inequality. The relative Gini coefficient in the baseline situation is 0.377. A 
comparison to the Gini coefficient from the liberalization scenario (0.966)
6 indicates a strong 
change in overall inequality (see Table 2). With an overall distribution index R of -0.589, in-
come is much more unequally distributed in terms of relative inequality in a liberalized market 
than it is in the baseline. P is slightly negative which indicates that the burden of liberalization is 
not proportionally shared among all farms. Small incomes bear a disproportionately high share 
of the burden from liberalization, which is caused by the higher share of support in income for 
small farms. Graphically, this would entail that the concentration curve of burden lies inside the 
Lorenz curve of baseline income. 
The sign of P determines the sign of the index of vertical redistribution V. The latter in-
creases with an increasing share of total burden on total baseline income (s). We can conclude 
that the vertical component of liberalization increases relative inequality (V = -0.231). This ef-
fect is augmented by re-ranking, which per definition always has a non-positive effect on equal-
ity. Re-ranking even contributes the majority of the unequalizing effect of liberalization to the 
overall effect (H = -0.356).  
The bottom line is that in relative terms farms with a higher income in the baseline tend to 
lose a lower share of their incomes due to an abolishment of agricultural policy than farms with 
lower income. But taking into account only the distribution of the burden from liberalization 
                                                       
 
 
6 Here a Gini coefficient close to one does not necessarily mean that income distribution is close to maximum ine-
quality because under the liberalization scenario several negative incomes are included in the data. Consequently, a 
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would underestimate the distributional effect due to an arbitrary design of support which leads 
to major re-ranking effects. Compared to the liberalization scenario, a cut in direct payments 
causes relatively low distribution effects. Even though P has a higher (negative) value compared 
to the liberalization scenario, distributive impacts are lower. This is because the share of the to-
tal burden of liberalization on total baseline income is relatively small (10%). Re-ranking effects 
virtually do not occur. 
Now we turn our attention to the absolute Gini comparison (Table 3). The absolute Gini 
index is invariant against absolute changes of income. The overall absolute effect of redistribu-
tion (AR) for the liberalization scenario is positive, which indicates that – in absolute terms – 
the distribution of income is more equal in the new situation. The absolute index of vertical eq-
uity is positive (which is a mandatory condition in case of a positive R as H always has a nega-
tive sign), so farms with higher income tend to bear a higher absolute burden from liberalization 
compared to farms with lower income. The re-ranking effect reduces the vertical component by 
about half its size. Similar, but much more moderate effects occur in the scenario of a 50% re-
duction of direct payments. 
 
Table 3: Decomposition of changes in absolute income inequality 
Absolute inequality (invariant to absolute   
changes)    Liberalization Scenario 
 
50% DP Cut Scenario 
Absolute Gini index of baseline income  AGx  9564  9564 
Absolute Gini index of scenario  AGy  7266  9119 
Absolute total redistributive effect  AR  2297  444 
Absolute index of re-ranking  AH  -2673  -34 
Absolute index of vertical equity  AV  4970  478 
Note: Absolute Gini indices are estimated using the sgini Stata command developed by Van Kerm (2009). 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The different evaluation of changes in distribution depending on the applied measure of 
inequality is interesting regarding the discussion on which design is best for agricultural policy. 
As, for example, Allanson (2006, p. 4) argues, an absolute measure might be better suited as the 
“presumed proportionality of transfers is precisely the basis of the widespread criticism of exist-
ing farm support programs as poorly targeted and inequitable”. Following this line of argument, 
the CAP indeed leads to a more unequal distribution compared to a situation with a liberalized 
agricultural market. 
In an analogous calculation (figures not presented here) for the whole German agricul-
tural sector we find similar results; however, due to the dominance of corporate farms in eastern 
Germany, FFI is not applicable as an indicator. FFI plus wages per agricultural working unit is 
used to ensure comparability between different farm structures. For both the relative and abso-
lute indices, trends go in the same direction, though they differ in their extent. Nevertheless, the 
interpretation of the indicator FFI plus wages would be somewhat different as we compare dis-
tributions regarding their return to labor and unpaid factors owned by the farm operator per ag-
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3.3. Distributional impacts of nonfarm income 
In this section we present our results concerning the impact of liberalizing the agricultural 
market while also considering nonfarm income. Therefore we compare the analysis of the indi-
cator FFI (Section 3.2) with an analysis of the indicator FFI plus nonfarm income, both based 
on relative Gini coefficients. Nonfarm income is not part of the modelling system described in 
2.1 and we assume data of the base period to be constant. This probably leads to an underesti-
mation of inequality compensation effects of nonfarm income because it can be expected that 
nonfarm income and government support are negatively correlated (e.g. Vergara et al., 2004; 
Kwon et al., 2006).  
In  the  baseline scenario, nonfarm  income  and  FFI  are  slightly  negatively  correlated.
7 
Thus, one would expect a lower Gini coefficient for the baseline. This can be confirmed as the 
Gini coefficient when including the nonfarm income is 0.290 compared to 0.377 in the case in 
which nonfarm income is not included (Table 4). Quite a high difference can be realized when 
comparing  the  two  Gini  coefficients  in  the  liberalization  scenario.  The  Gini  coefficient  is 
roughly one-third lower when nonfarm income is included, which leads to a relatively low R. 
The decomposition of R shows that the vertical effect V becomes very small (-0.069), but that 
the re-ranking effect H stays at quite a high level. We can thus conclude that many farms with a 
relatively small baseline FFI and a relatively high nonfarm income ascend due to liberalization 
in the ranking and overtake farms with primarily higher FFI and a relatively low nonfarm in-
come. By additionally taking into account nonfarm income, the overall unequalizing effect of 
liberalization is significantly reduced. 
 
Table 4: Decomposition of changes in relative income inequality for FFI and FFI plus 
nonfarm income for the liberalization scenario 
 - Relative inequality (scale invariant)    FFI  FFI + nonfarm income 
Gini coefficient of baseline income  Gx  0.377  0.290 
Gini coefficient of scenario (after policy change)  Gy  0.966  0.571 
Concentration coefficient of scenario  Cy  0.611  0.359 
Concentration coefficient of support (base income 
– scenario income)  CB  0.278  0.230 
Average rate of support (support/base income)  s  0.70  0.54 
Total redistributive effect  R  -0.589  -0.281 
Index of re-ranking  H  -0.356  -0.212 
Index of vertical equity  V  -0.231  -0.069 
Index of progressivity of support  P  -0.099  -0.060 
Note: Gini and concentration coefficients are estimated using the sgini Stata command developed by Van Kerm 
(2009). 
Source: Own calculations. 
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4.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In our paper we account for distributional effects of agricultural policy on income among 
western German farms. The analysis is based on results of different scenarios calculated by an 
integrated modelling system for the year 2015. This allows us to include incentive effects that 
occur due to a liberalization of the agricultural sector. To measure the distributional impacts of 
liberalization we use a method based on the comparison of Gini indices that distinguishes be-
tween vertical and re-ranking effects. There are remaining deficiencies of the analysis. Signifi-
cant structural changes can be expected from liberalization of the agricultural market, which 
cannot be depicted in the current model specifications (Deppermann et al., 2010). Second, be-
cause of grouping farms and using average income for the analysis, it is possible to account for 
between-group inequality only. 
Our results differ depending on the normative decision of the measure of inequality. In 
relative terms, liberalization of the western German agricultural sector leads to a more unequal 
distribution of FFI, whereas in absolute terms a liberalized market provides a more equal situa-
tion. In both cases, significant re-ranking effects occur which lead us to support Allanson’s 
(2006, p. 126) conclusion, drawn for Scotland, that agricultural support is inefficient as a redis-
tributive tool. One reason for re-ranking might be the commodity based organization of agricul-
tural support programs. When nonfarm income is also included, we find that the overall un-
equalizing effect (in relative terms) of liberalization is significantly reduced. This is another 
reason to conclude that agricultural support is inefficient as a redistributive tool: income policy 
should be related to total household income and not to isolated income from any single source. 
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